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Following the collapse of a half-hearted peace initiative in 2015, Kurdish violence against the 
Turkish state escalated once again, with high profile attacks in Ankara and İstanbul as well as 
in the southeast of the country. The attacks were spearheaded by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks 
(TAK) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Both groups are violent manifestations of 
Kurdish nationalism and serve as reminders of the Turkish state’s failure to deal with the 
Kurdish question. Although the TAK has always been seen as more ruthless than the PKK, 
from which it split in the early 2000s, the muted condemnation of a particularly violent TAK 
attack in 2016 from Cemil Bayık, co-founder and co-leader of the PKK, highlighted the shared 
interpretation and acceptance of the need for violence by both groups. After the attacks, Bayık 
stated “Kurdish cities are burned – destroyed. Civilians are dead. Their culture is being 
trampled upon. Thousands are forced to flee their homes. If the TAK take action in these 
conditions the people will be sympathetic” (BBC News 2018). The Turkish state’s response to 
the attacks was to block media reporting on the issue, to reinforce its military pursuit of Kurdish 
radicals in southeast Turkey and Syria, and to engage further in the suppression and persecution 
of all Kurdish politics, whether this was peacefully expressed or not. The number of political 
figures, journalists and activists (often spuriously) imprisoned for supporting Kurdish terrorism 
jumped significantly following 2015, while the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
saw electoral gains for its tough response to terrorism (Çiçek 2018). 
One of the particularly interesting aspects of this escalation in violence, and the state’s response 
to it, was the backdrop against which they occurred. The violence was the fallout of the collapse 
of two peace initiatives with the PKK over the previous decade. While recent attacks were 
condemned by Western governments, the fighters of the YPG (People’s Protection Units), a 
Syrian Kurdish military organisation closely linked to the PKK, were being praised, supported 
and equipped by British and US forces for their role in the fight against ISIS.1 Western 
countries accept the PKK’s designation as a terrorist group, but when the YPG (and there is a 
large degree of cross and dual membership between the YPG and the PKK, see Kaya and Lowe 
2018) fight in Syria against ISIS, they are lauded. This position becomes even more incoherent 
when it is noted that for Kurds, there is no difference in their motivation whether they are 
fighting in Turkey or Syria. In both instances, they see their role as protecting Kurdish 
communities from suppression and attempting to advance their desired political system of 
democratic confederalism within the host country. It is little wonder then that the Turkish state 
is left frustrated by the West’s response to what it sees as terrorists undermining its authority 
from both within its borders and from neighbouring Syria. This, in turn, incentivised the AKP 
and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to seek alliances with Russia in an effort to shape the 
future of Syria, rather than relying on its relationship with the US and Europe. 
From this snapshot it is evident that the Kurdish question in Turkey is highly intractable, having 
proved stubbornly resilient in the face of half-hearted peace initiatives and full-blooded violent 
confrontation with Turkey’s Armed Forces. It has domestic, regional and international 
dimensions which further complicate the picture. Kurdish nationalists seek to carve out a space 
in Turkish politics that recognises what they claim are its distinctive culture, language, and 
political preferences – a distinctiveness the Turkish state has historically denied until recently. 
In its radical manifestation, Kurdish ethno-nationalism has used rebellions and violent conflict 
as part of this political struggle ever since the foundation of the Turkish republic and also 
during Ottoman times. As such, the Kurdish question has deep historical roots and the very 
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foundation of the Turkish state and its political institutionalisation laid the ground for a conflict 
between a dominant Turkishness and a peripheral Kurdishness. At its heart, the Kurdish 
question is a political issue – for Kurds it is about demanding respect for their human and 
cultural rights, a quest for self-determination (initially in the form of secession but now seeking 
increased power for local administrations) and political recognition. However, for the state it 
is simply a violent challenge to its authority and its territorial integrity and a challenge to the 
majority will of Turks. Therefore, traditional Turkish state responses to the Kurdish challenge 
have been non-recognition and violent and non-violent suppression. 
 
Identifying the number of Kurds within Turkey is a difficult task given that since the 1930s 
and until very recently, Turkey has denied that the Kurds existed as a distinct minority and 
therefore did not count them separately. Population estimates vary widely with McDowall’s 
(1989) admittedly now somewhat dated estimate of 8.5 million, while the CIA Factbook (2017) 
estimates Kurds to be 19% of the population (approximately 15 million), compared to Kurdish 
groups estimates of closer to 20 million.2 Originally located in the east and southeast of the 
country, these have historically been the most deprived and underdeveloped regions of Turkey, 
with the relative economic and social position of the Kurds being further disadvantaged by the 
historically nomadic and then farming lifestyle of the Kurds (White 2000, 93). Industrialisation 
and economic liberalisation generated fewer gains for Kurdish populated regions of Turkey 
compared to the rest of the country, adding further grievances to Kurdish nationalism. 
Although the state has embarked on some limited initiatives to tackle this, economic 
underdevelopment and Kurdish violence have formed somewhat of a negative reinforcing 
cycle that further complicates the picture. 
 
In this chapter we trace the origins of the ‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey – a rather euphemistic 
phrase for a deeply troubling and violent cleavage that strips the issue of its intensity (much 
akin to the use of the phrase ‘The Troubles’ to describe the conflict in Northern Ireland for 30 
years). We examine how it emerged, how to characterise the nature of the confrontation and 
the basis of different perspectives on the issue, how it evolved since Ottoman times through to 
the foundation of the Republic until the present day, and the future prospects for the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. Throughout we wish to make two modest but important points: (1) the 
Kurdish question needs to be placed in its historical context for any adequate understanding; 
and, (2) at its core is a political contestation whose form and shape is defined by the political 
response of the state as well as its own internal political dynamics. 
 
 
Change and Continuity in the Kurdish Question in Turkey 
 
We can broadly define the Kurdish Question as referring to the political demands of the 
Kurdish community, originally located in the east and southeast of the country, for greater 
recognition. These demands have changed over time from seeking territorial and tribal power, 
to demanding a separate state, to decentralisation within the established Turkish state. In other 
words, it has always had a territorial dimension, but whether that territory is independent or 
accommodated within the Turkish state has shifted. The other important dimension is how the 
state should respond to the very questioning by Kurdish nationalists of its legitimacy. This has 
been largely consistent for most of the duration of the Turkish republic – namely denial of the 
distinctiveness of Kurds and instead emphasising shared identities (labelling Kurds ‘mountain 
Turks’ or focusing on the shared Sunni Muslim roots of Turks and Kurds), suppressing political 
challengers and increasingly securitising the issue in the name of protecting Turkey. More 
recently, this changed somewhat under the AKP when they explored basic cultural recognition 
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and a possible peace initiative, but this did not last and today it appears to be a return to business 
as usual. As such, we can see change but primarily continuity on both sides. 
 
 
Kurdish revolts in the Ottoman Empire  
 
Kurdish nationalist historiography typically lauds revolts led by Kurdish tribal leaders in the 
late Ottoman period. This is not only because their violent resistance against a more powerful 
state is admired, but it is primarily done in an effort to ‘prove’ the existence of a distinct 
Kurdish nationalist consciousness and Kurdish ethnic self-identification going back centuries 
(Hassanpour 2003, 148). In reality, the nature of these revolts is deeply contested as to whether 
they were nationalistic or whether they were simply reactions to the multi-ethnic Ottoman 
Empire’s centralisation policies (Olson 1991). 
 
The 19th century Ottoman Empire witnessed several Kurdish tribal revolts. Most notable among 
these were revolts led by Kör Muhammad Pasha, Bedirhan Pasha, and Sheikh Ubeydullah.3 
The centralisation policies of the Ottoman Empire provided the main political context for these 
revolts. The Ottoman Empire’s foreign influence and internal control was in decline throughout 
the 18th and 19th centuries and, therefore, under Sultan Mahmud II and later Abdulmecid,4 the 
Ottomans began to implement several reforms, including centralisation policies that sought to 
revive the power and strength of the Empire. Centralisation in these reforms sought to eliminate 
the authority of increasingly powerful ayans (local lords). Many scholars and present-day 
Kurdish nationalists consider these as the first Kurdish nationalist rebellions that occurred in 
reaction to the destruction of emirates and principalities by the Ottomans (Jwaideh 2006). 
 
Yet other scholars argue that although these tribal leaders claimed that their aim was to ‘liberate 
Kurdistan’, essentially their revolts were aimed at regaining the status they lost as a result of 
the process of centralisation (Tahiri 2007). These revolts must be understood in the context of 
complex centre-periphery relations between local rulers and the Ottoman state. This 
relationship was based on the assumption that the rebels perceived resistance as a means of 
bargaining and negotiation between the centre and periphery (Mardin 2008). Therefore, 
Kurdish revolts in the 19th century can also be understood as attempts to force the state into a 
new deal in order to regain their loss of status and authority (Bozarslan 2003). Another 
important factor that led to reactions by Kurdish tribal leaders was the increasing recognition 
of non-Muslim communities as part of the reforms Ottomans initiated in early nineteenth 
century. For instance, Sheikh Ubeydullah was concerned about possible Armenian control in 
Kurdistan, especially because of Article 71 of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, which promised 
Armenians certain ‘improvements and reforms’ and guaranteed their ‘security against 
Circassians and Kurds’ (Jwaideh 2006, 83). All these developments, together with increased 
Christian missionary activity, led Kurdish tribal leaders to feel threatened and incentivised 
revolution against the state. Whether these revolts were undertaken in the name of Kurdish 
nationalism, however, is more debatable. Rather it seems that when there was an advantage in 
doing so, Kurdish tribal leaders were happy to make deals with the Ottoman state. 
 
Nonetheless, this early period of Kurdish revolts set a precedent for the subsequent 
development and crystallization of Kurdish nationalism. When it became clear that the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable and that Ottomanism was no longer feasible, 
Kurdish nationalism began to emerge as a distinct movement separate from pan-Turkism and 
pan-Islamism (Klein 2007). Of course, we need to be cautious is asserting that this era 
represented the emergence of a homogenous Kurdish nationalism and that all Kurds now 
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aspired for their own state. Rather the picture was much more mixed, with some Kurdish 
leaders seeking autonomy within the Empire while others sought an independent state. Indeed, 
two of the founding members of the Committee of Union and Progress5 were Kurdish who saw 
the place of the Kurds as being within a reformed Empire or a future Turkey. However, what 
is clear is that these early revolts gave an impetus to separatist Kurdish nationalism, which was 
then emerging in line with the political opportunities of the time and the rise of the principle 
of self-determination in the post WWI era. When the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified in 1923, 
which led to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, it was clear that self-determination 
would not extend to the Kurds. Instead Kurds were to sit inside a new Turkish state, setting the 
scene for future conflict. 
 
 
Kurdish politics in the early years of the Republic 
 
Along with secularism, Turkishness was adopted as the identity of the new Republic. İsmet 
İnönü, second prime minister of Turkey, declared in 1925: “as Turks are in the majority, other 
groups do not have any power. Our mission is to Turkify non-Turkish groups in the Turkish 
vatan [homeland]. We are going to extirpate groups who oppose Turks and Turkishness” 
(quoted in Özkan 2012). In other words, the only way Kurds could gain full political 
recognition and participation was by being Turks and giving up on any pretence of being Kurds. 
The new Republic was also intent on modernising its creaking foundations and therefore the 
underdeveloped, poorly educated and 'backwards' southeast was a problem for Ankara who 
sought to bring it tighter under its control. Ankara expropriated landholdings in the region and 
distributed them to Turks, not local Kurds, and further compounded this by placing restrictions 
on the use of the Kurdish language (Barkey 2017). These factors alienated the politically 
minded and religious Kurdish elite from the new state, setting a hostile relationship and one 
that was to be characterised by further violent revolt. In fact, Kurdish groups revolted against 
the state 28 times between 1923 to 1938 (Başaran 2018, 17). The response of the state set the 
tone that would be followed over the coming decades. 
 
The first large scale Kurdish rebellion of the new Republican era was the 1925 Sheikh Said 
Revolt. The organisation behind the revolt was Azadi (meaning ‘freedom’), a secret 
organisation of Kurdish officers and tribal leaders founded in Erzurum in 1923. Sheikh Said, a 
well-known Sunni sheikh, was selected to be the leader of the revolt in the hope that a revolt 
with a religious character would make mobilisation easier at a time when Kurdish nationalism 
was weak among the masses (Tahiri 2007). The weakness of the idea of Kurdish nationalism 
is evident from the fact that the revolt drew support mainly from Zaza-speaking Sunni Kurds 
while Alevi Kurds from Dersim as well as some Sunni Kurds and tribes in Van, Diyarbakır 
and Elazığ refused to support him and joined in the suppression of the revolt. The revolt was 
easily defeated and Sheikh Said and other Kurdish leaders were executed for the crime of 
attempting to establish an independent Kurdish state. For Barkey and Fuller (1998), the state’s 
response represented a shift from ignoring the Kurdish issue to adopting a policy of violence 
towards the Kurds. 
 
The execution of Said and the ease and severity with which the revolution was put down, did 
not prevent further attempts at revolution over the next decade. This period of tribal and local 
revolt was to end with the violent suppression of the Dersim revolt in 1938. At the time, Turkish 
government policies, particularly land confiscations and deportations, were sources of 
discontent among Kurdish tribal leaders and sheikhs. A religious leader, Sayyid Reza, led the 
Dersim revolt from 1937-8 but it too was ultimately easily defeated by the more powerful 
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Turkish forces and it exposed divisions within Kurds as much as between Kurds and Turks. 
The state’s response was exceptionally heavy handed with thousands of Kurds killed and many 
more displaced while Dersim was renamed Tunceli (a more acceptable Turkish name) in the 
process. 
 
The response to Kurdish revolts in this first decade confirmed the new state’s direction of the 
assimilation of the Kurds into the Turkish state, including by force where necessary. 
Additionally, the state embarked on a programme of the repression of Kurdish nationalist 
culture and language. Kurds were forcibly exiled to different parts of the country and the 
official state media stopped referring to them as ‘Kurds’. Yet alongside this, if Kurds accepted 
a Turkish identity and participated in the system as Turkish citizens, a full range of political, 
economic and social opportunities were available to them. 
 
 
Kurds in the Early Multiparty Era – The Calm Before the Storm 
 
Kurds were mostly politically inactive in the 1940s and 1950s. After the Dersim revolt, there 
was a lack of localized rebellion or Kurdish leadership to lead any future revolts. The Turkish 
state largely maintained its position of suppressing a distinct Kurdish identity, but the arrival 
of multiparty politics and the Democrat Party (DP) diffused tensions somewhat. The DP, which 
was electorally very successful in the east and southeast, agreed to ease some cultural 
restrictions and to reduce oppressive local policing (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 14). As such, the 
1960s was a period of relative peace and the Kurdish question fell into the background, eclipsed 
by other more pressing political developments. 
 
By the 1970s, politically active Kurds were joining leftist movements during a period of wider 
left-wing mobilization throughout the country as a whole. From the left’s perspective, Kurdish 
groups were natural allies given the high levels of relative socio-economic underdevelopment 
in southeast Turkey, while Kurds hoped that the left’s confrontation with the state could also 
be used to advance their position within the country. However, over time Kurdish nationalists 
who threw their lot in with the left became frustrated with the lack of progress on Kurdish 
issues and seeming levels of apathy amongst mainstream leftists, eventually leading to the 
distinct emergence of Kurdish movements with leftist inclinations. It was out of one such leftist 
movement that the PKK emerged in 1974 and adopted the aim of liberating Kurdistan and 
establishing an independent, united and socialist Kurdish state. At this time there were also the 
first electoral breakthroughs for Kurdish nationalists running as independents but clearly 
affiliated with the PKK position. In the 1977 local elections, Medhi Zana was elected mayor 
in Batman, while Orhan Alpaslan in Ağrı and Edip Solmaz in Diyarbakır repeated the feat the 
following year (Natali 2005, 106). 
 
 
Coup Politics and the Violent Radicalization of the Kurdish Question 
 
From the 1980s onwards the Kurdish question was to become synonymous with a conflict 
between the Turkish military and the PKK. This enabled the Turkish military, as guardians of 
the secular and modern Republic, to take further control of the state's Kurdish policy, 
something it had largely been doing anyway since the 1971 coup at least. The 1980 coup proved 
to be a seminal event for defining the trajectory of the Kurdish question, following which there 




Although the coup was ostensibly aimed at protecting the state from leftist radicals, the Kurdish 
movement was also targeted. During the period of the military rule (12 September 1980 to 6 
November 1983), many Kurdish activists were imprisoned and tortured. Additional oppressive 
measures were imposed, including further restrictions on Kurdish language and culture. This 
had the effect of bonding the Kurdish movement around a shared notion of resistance, further 
reinforced by the use of myth (Güneş 2017). When this was combined with the PKK's ability 
to use local politics and local conditions on the ground to its advantage (Romano 2006), a 
radical Kurdish movement was able to emerge on a stronger and more coherent level than had 
been previously seen in Turkey. 
 
The PKK's goal was to overthrow Turkish rule (economically as well as politically, given its 
Marxist inclinations) and to unify Kurds and secure a separate state. Their guerrilla campaign 
began in 1984 and, in the mountainous terrain of southeast Turkey combined with porous 
borders with Iraq and support from Syria, was to prove remarkably resilient. Drawing on local 
resources as well as support from the Kurdish diaspora and Kurds in neighbouring countries, 
the number of PKK recruits and levels of violence increased steadily throughout the 1980s and 
reached a high in the 1990s (Tezcür 2014; Romano’s chapter in this volume). Nonetheless, the 
Turkish state was clearly never going to be defeated or forced into a position to concede to the 
demands of the PKK and instead it responded with a scorched earth policy. Villages were 
razed, whole towns became securitised, people were forcibly relocated, and arrests, detention 
and torture continued. This had the consequence of increasing the popularity of the PKK within 
Kurdish communities. 
 
Although this was the predominant picture for the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdish issue was not 
completely static. For example, Turgut Özal, prime minster for much of the 1980s and 
president from 1989-1993 for the Motherland Party, attempted to move beyond a purely 
security-based response to the Kurds. He criticised an exclusively military approach and 
advocated pursuing cultural, economic, social and political measures too, representing the first 
time a Turkish government saw the issue as a political one and not just a security issue (Efegil 
2011). In part as a result of Özal's initiative, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1993 
(albeit it did not last for more than a few months). Abdullah Öcalan, leader and co-founder of 
the PKK, was subsequently captured and arrested in Kenya with US help after being forced to 
leave his safe-haven in Syria following Turkish pressure on the Assad regime, and he remains 
imprisoned on İmralı island to this day. Soon after Öcalan’s imprisonment, the PKK declared 
the movement was no longer striving for full independence but now sought recognition and 
autonomy within the Turkish state and called on the government to engage in negotiations. The 
call went unheeded and the military clearly won out over Özal's suggested change in direction. 
 
Attempts to advance Kurdish goals through the electoral arena also became more prominent in 
the 1990s. The first openly Kurdish political parties emerged to compete in elections. The 
People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) performed relatively well in the southeast in the 1995 
general election, but only secured just over 4 per cent of the national vote share, falling short 
of the required 10 per cent threshold needed to gain seats in the Grand National Assembly. 
Successive Kurdish parties and loose electoral alliances polled at somewhere between four to 
six per cent in general elections in 1999 and 2002. Although these parties failed to gain any 
representation, they did raise the profile of Kurdish politics. However, the state made it clear 
that the political route was no more of a viable route for Kurdish aspirations than a military 
one. Kurdish parties were typically met with party bans and harassment to which Kurdish 
groups responded by reinventing themselves or running as independents (Öktem 2011). In this 
 7 
way, a kind of cat and mouse game played out. From the state’s perspective, Kurdish political 
parties were best seen as extensions of the PKK that aimed to bolster its campaign and goals 
and therefore an equal threat to the state. However, the suppressive response served to further 
restrict the scope for the Kurdish political movement, further entrenching their claims that a 
military campaign was necessary and justified. 
 
 
The AKP and the Kurdish Question – From Fresh Thinking to More of the Same 
 
The AKP in office appeared initially to offer something different to their governing 
predecessors that gave them an advantage in their relationship with the Kurdish population. As 
a mildly Islamist party that emerged out of the Welfare Party, its leadership and members also 
had a history of being politically suppressed and harassed by the state. What is more, the pious 
and socially conservative dimension to the party had a natural resonance with the Kurdish 
southeast.6 The AKP positioned itself as a party that would represent those who were left 
behind in Turkey’s recent economic modernization, and this resonated as much with the 
economically under-developed southeast as it did with the conservative electorate of Konya. 
Alongside this sat the EU accession process, which saw the treatment of the Kurds as a human 
rights issue that needed to be tackled if Turkey was to advance its membership aspirations. 
Therefore, there were significant incentives for the AKP to explore ways to ameliorate the 
position of Turkey’s Kurds and initially there was a break with the traditional approach to 
managing the issue. 
 
During its first term in government, the AKP granted limited rights to broadcast in Kurdish and 
for Kurdish pupils to receive their education in their mother tongue. Alongside this, other EU-
incentivised measures also meant that the new government’s policy significantly differed from 
what came before. In a speech in 2005, Erdoğan even went so far as to state that the ‘state has 
made mistakes about the Kurdish issue’ (Özkan 2011) and to claim that Kurdishness should be 
recognised as a sub-identity of Turkishness. The abolition of the death penalty, the release of 
former Kurdish MPs from prison, and the end of emergency rule in the southeast alleviated 
local tensions. Needless to say, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP, essentially the 
modern day inheritors of Atatürk’s legacy), the Turkish-nationalist Nationalist Movement 
Party (MHP), and many senior military figures, opposed any change in the traditional policy 
towards managing the Kurdish question. Nonetheless, the new direction led to an electoral 
boost for the AKP in southeast Turkey in the 2007 election, and optimists asserted this might 
imply that moderate Kurds were peeling away from the PKK and its affiliated parties in return 
for cultural concessions from the state. 
 
Changes in policy from the AKP were also mirrored by important developments from those at 
the forefront of the Kurdish movement. As already noted, the capture of Öcalan in 1999 had 
resulted in a ceasefire from the PKK, which reduced immediate tensions on the ground. Many 
Kurds put their hopes behind the EU accession process as a way of advancing their position in 
Turkey. At this time, the first of two peace initiatives began in 2005, culminating in covert 
talks between Turkish intelligence, government representatives and members of the PKK in 
2008. While these collapsed in 2011 due to a lack of will on both sides, additional talks were 
undertaken, directly and more openly, between representatives of the AKP government and 
Abdullah Öcalan and members of the Kurdish political parties. These were held between 2013 
and 2015, after which they collapsed amidst tensions over the Syrian war and a lack of general 
progress (for full details, see the chapter by Çandar in this volume). 
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In the course of these talks the parameters of the Kurdish question as it plays out today can be 
seen. Whilst largely still driven by a desire for greater political recognition, it now also requires 
a war to peace transition. Öcalan has repeatedly indicated that the PKK is ready to negotiate a 
solution with the Turkish government that involves decentralisation for the Kurds within the 
existing boundaries of Turkey, a system he labels ‘democratic confederalism’ (Öcalan 2011). 
Singing from largely the same hymn sheet, Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP), has also called for a reorganisation of the administrative structure of 
Turkey based on the principle of decentralisation.7 Yet it became clear that limited cultural 
recognition was as far as the AKP was willing to go and both sides were anxious about retaining 
the support base they had built in the southeast, which limited their desire to make further any 
concessions. 
 
External factors, which were previously so propitious, today incentivise the AKP to return to a 
security based response. An EU accession process no longer looks viable for Turkey in the 
immediate future; the Syrian war and increased independence of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
have set worrying/encouraging (depending on your perspective) precedents for Kurdish 
autonomy; increasing centralisation of power in the hands of an authoritarian Erdoğan prohibits 
any decentralisation or power division; and, electoral dynamics bring the AKP and Turkish-
nationalist MHP together as well as incentivising the AKP to restrict the increasing electoral 
popularity of the HDP. These factors have all pushed the government towards a traditional militant 
policy to manage the Kurdish question. Therefore, since the collapse of the second peace initiative, 
and especially following the coup attempt in July 2016 and the ensuing period of emergency rule, 
the AKP has relentlessly embarked upon criminalising Kurdish activism and securitising the issue 
once again. At the same time, radical Kurdish nationalism has escalated its violence amidst the 
wider regional dynamics. 
 
The AKP’s change of tactic from talks and pursuing a Kurdish opening to instead securitising the 
issue is also the outcome of HDP’s electoral success since the presidential elections in 2014. The 
HDP’s co-leader, Demirtaş received 9.8 per cent of the vote share, indicating the possibility 
that the party could pass the 10 per cent threshold needed to gain representation in the 
legislature. This was something the party duly achieve in the 2015 June general elections. The 
party’s strategy to become a political party of Turkey and focus on improving the situation of 
all marginalised communities including the Kurds, while maintaining its leftist welfare 
distribution policies appealed to the liberal minded Turkish electorate as well as Kurds who do 
not support the PKK. HDP’s breakthrough in the 2015 elections meant that Kurdish MPs 
entered the Parliament as a party for the first time, and prevented the AKP from securing a 
majority. Erdoğan’s response was to hold a snap election just five months later, going back to 
the traditional securitised response to the Kurdish question, criminalising Kurdish MPs, 
stripping 50 of the their 59 MPs of their parliamentary immunity, and imprisoning many of 
them. Demirtaş has been detained in prison since November 2016 and ran his election 
campaign for presidential elections in June 2018 from prison. In the mean time, clashes 
between the Turkish army and the PKK increased during which the PKK used urban warfare 
tactics, which led to a highly severe response by Turkish security forces and the displacement 
of large numbers of people from cities and towns in the southeast. Additionally, the Turkish 
army started its cross-border military campaign in Afrin in Syria, which was under de facto 
Kurdish control, and took the city. All this served to boost the electoral fortunes of the AKP 
and entrench the traditional dynamic on both sides. The Kurdish question, the PKK’s tactics, 






The failure to resolve the Kurdish question has had deep costs, for Turks, Kurds and for the 
state in both blood and treasure. Given the pessimistic history of the Kurdish question, is there 
any reason to be optimistic for a change in the future? The answer in the immediate future is 
certainly not. Radical groups tend to moderate when internal political reappraisals are met with 
political opportunities for inclusion from the state (Whiting 2018). However, in the case of 
Kurdish radicalism, there is little hope for an internal reappraisal when Kurdish leaders fear a 
decline in violence may threaten their survival and influence (Tezcür 2010). What is more, 
there is no sign of the state reopening any opportunities for dialogue any time soon (see Çandar 
in this volume). Regional dynamics in the form of the Syrian war also restricts future prospects 
for a resolution in two ways. Firstly, fears that an autonomous Kurdish region (Rojava or 
Western Kurdistan) will emerge on its border restricts the opportunities the Turkish state is 
willing to extend to its Kurdish population and it willingness to engage the PKK in dialogue. 
Secondly, the Syrian war increased divisions between different Kurdish groups in the region 
and the resulting intra-group dynamic restricts the concessions Turkey’s Kurds are willing to 
consider (Kaya and Whiting 2016). 
 
The medium to long-term looks no better. Given the historical nature of the Kurdish issue, 
fundamental structural changes in the state’s approach are necessary, but at no stage in the 
history of the Republic has there been any sign of such a change becoming embedded policy. 
Furthermore, the political nature of the Kurdish question, with both sides squeezing the room 
for manoeuvre of the other while also using the actions of each other to justify escalations, 
gives further cause for pessimism. All conflicts can appear intractable until they are resolved 
and cases like the FARC and the IRA show that deeply militaristic movements can change 
direction. But again this brings us back to the need for a reappraisal on both sides in order to 
achieve a breakthrough. With no sign of defeat or victory forthcoming for either side, a 
negotiated settlement looks highly necessary but also highly unlikely. 
 
 
1 Britain denies ever having equipped the YPG or given it any weapons but it does provide air and other forms 
of support. A recent UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee report shows that the FCO holds an incoherent 
position given it claims to reject the PKK but has not fully examined the links between the YPG and PKK. See 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2018). 
2 Over 22.5 million Kurds live in Turkey, new Turkish statistics reveal, EKurd Daily, 20 September 2012, 
https://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/9/turkey4166.htm 
3 Interestingly, in all three of these cases the leaders of the revolts were later appeased by the Ottoman Empire 
with positions and appointments within the Empire, which were readily accepted. 
4 Sultan Mahmud reigned from 1808-1839 while Abdulmecid reigned from 1839-1861. 
5 The Committee for Union and Progress was an umbrella group of many diverse views that came to be 
associated with the Young Turk movement. It was a secret society later turned political party that called for 
reform of the Empire but which sought to hold the territory under its control together, albeit there was 
disagreement within the movement on what direction this should take. 
6 This was to prove a hindrance to peace a few years later when it became clear to the AKP that the southeast 
was a key electoral battleground they needed to win and therefore needed to restrict Kurdish parties from 
succeeding. 
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